

CONFIDENTIAL

From: Scully, Brian [/O=EXCHANGELABS/OU=EXCHANGE ADMINISTRATIVE GROUP (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/CN=RECIPIENTS/CN=7CA10604AEE04B1DA853DC9F884130BD-SCULLY, BRI]  
Sent: 3/25/2020 12:17:14 PM  
To: [REDACTED]@fb.com]  
Subject: RE: Disinfo Campaign Targeting DS Officer

Thanks Saleela. Hope you and the family are also well.

Brian

From: [REDACTED]@fb.com>  
Sent: Wednesday, March 25, 2020 11:33 AM  
To: Scully, Brian [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov> [REDACTED]@fb.com>  
Subject: RE: Disinfo Campaign Targeting DS Officer

CAUTION: This email originated from outside of DHS. DO NOT click links or open attachments unless you recognize and/or trust the sender. Contact your component SOC with questions or concerns.

Thank you so much for this! Have flagged for our internal teams. As always, we really appreciate the outreach and sharing of this information. Hope you and your family are safe and sound!

From: Scully, Brian [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>  
Sent: Wednesday, March 25, 2020 11:05 AM  
To: [REDACTED]@fb.com>; [REDACTED]@fb.com>  
Subject: FW: Disinfo Campaign Targeting DS Officer

[REDACTED] and [REDACTED]

Please see the below reporting from our State Department Global Engagement Center colleagues about disinformation on YouTube targeting a Diplomatic Security Officer.

Regards,  
Brian

*The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) is not the originator of this information. CISA is forwarding this information, unedited, from its originating source – this information has not been originated or generated by CISA. This information may also be shared with law enforcement or intelligence agencies.*

*In the event that CISA follows up to request further information, such a request is not a requirement or demand. Responding to this request is voluntary and CISA will not take any action, favorable or unfavorable, based on decisions about whether or not to respond to this follow-up request for information.*

From: Dempsey, Alex L. [REDACTED]@state.gov>  
Sent: Wednesday, March 25, 2020 10:30 AM  
To: Schaul, Robert  
Subject: Disinfo Campaign Targeting DS Officer



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Rob,

Our leadership has asked that we share the below information with our IA counterparts. There is a disinfo campaign on Youtube targeting a DS Officer, claiming she brought COVID-19 to during an athletic competition. FYSA FBI has been alerted.

**Who: DS Officer, Maatje Benassi**

**What: Targeted Disinformation Campaign**

**When: O/A March 24<sup>th</sup>**

**Where: Online** [REDACTED]

**Why:**

Special Envoy, Lea Gabrielle received a note from a journalist on March 24<sup>th</sup> who tells me there is a false narrative being pushed online about someone who is believed to be a Diplomatic Security officer. Her name is Maatje Benassi. The journalist tells me there is a Youtube channel run by Americans falsely claiming she is "Patient Zero" and that as a U.S. Army reservist she brought COVID-19 to Wuhan during an athletic competition.

V/r,

Alex

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**From:** [REDACTED]@fb.com]  
**Sent:** 3/13/2020 11:13:52 AM  
**To:** Scully, Brian [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov]  
**CC:** [REDACTED]@fb.com]  
**Subject:** Re: Tweet regarding voting & COVID-19 - DISINFORMATION

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Thanks, Brian!

Sent from my iPhone

On Mar 13, 2020, at 10:55 AM, Scully, Brian [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov> wrote:

[REDACTED] and [REDACTED]

Apparently the tweet I sent has been taken down. Please see the screenshot below with the tweet.

Thanks,  
Brian

**From:** Masterson, Matthew [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>  
**Sent:** Friday, March 13, 2020 10:51 AM  
**To:** Scully, Brian [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>  
**Cc:** Hale, Geoffrey [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>; Snell, Allison [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>  
**Subject:** FW: Tweet regarding voting & COVID-19 - DISINFORMATION

From OH in screen shot form and reported to CIOCC.

Matthew V. Masterson  
Senior Cybersecurity Advisor  
Department of Homeland Security  
Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]@hq.dhs.gov

**From:** Wood, Spencer [REDACTED]@OhioSOS.Gov>  
**Sent:** Friday, March 13, 2020 10:39 AM  
**To:** SecurityEvent [REDACTED]@OhioSOS.Gov>; elections [REDACTED]@msisac.org>; MS-ISAC [REDACTED]@msisac.org>  
**Cc:** Masterson, Matthew [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>; Keeling, Jon [REDACTED]@OhioSOS.Gov>; Grandjean, Amanda [REDACTED]@OhioSOS.Gov>; Burns, [REDACTED]@OhioSOS.Gov>; Keeling, Jon [REDACTED]@OhioSOS.Gov>; Shaffer, Grant [REDACTED]@OhioSOS.Gov>; McAfee, Sean [REDACTED]@OhioSOS.Gov>  
**Subject:** Tweet regarding voting & COVID-19 - DISINFORMATION

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The following disinformation regarding upcoming Ohio, Florida, Illinois, Louisiana, and Wisconsin elections and COVID-19 was posted to twitter:

<https://twitter.com/coocbie/status/1238465759745134593?s=21>

<image.png>

<~WRD318.jpg>

Spencer Wood | Chief Information Officer  
Office of the Ohio Secretary of State  
P: + [REDACTED] C: + [REDACTED]  
[OhioSoS.gov](http://OhioSoS.gov)

Messages

10:31 AM

62%



## Thread



**Caden**  
@coocbie

DEAR ALL BOOMERS,

Due to COVID-19, it should be in your highest interest to refrain from entering polling stations in Illinois, Florida, Ohio, Louisiana, and Wisconsin!!!


This is for your own safety.

I repeat, BOOMERS DO NOT VOTE

10:03 AM · 3/13/20 · Twitter Web App

6 Likes



 **Caden @coocbie** · 25m

Tweet your reply



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**From:** Masterson, Matthew [/O=EXCHANGELABS/OU=EXCHANGE ADMINISTRATIVE GROUP (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/CN=RECIPIENTS/CN=96EE6758666E4BD19924CB287A857503-MATTHEW.MAS]  
**Sent:** 6/2/2020 1:57:42 PM  
**To:** Scully, Brian [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov]; [REDACTED]@twitter.com]  
**CC:** [REDACTED]@twitter.com]  
**Subject:** RE: Primary Election Day

[REDACTED]

Just to confirm what Brian said. Very quiet so far. Please let us know if any of the items passed to you today are worth understanding further or if something changes. Thanks

Matt

Matthew V. Masterson  
Senior Cybersecurity Advisor  
Department of Homeland Security  
Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]@hq.dhs.gov

**From:** Scully, Brian [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>  
**Sent:** Tuesday, June 2, 2020 1:41 PM  
**To:** [REDACTED]@twitter.com>; Masterson, Matthew [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>  
**Cc:** [REDACTED]@twitter.com>  
**Subject:** RE: Primary Election Day

Hi [REDACTED]

It has been quiet on our end as well. As an FYI, we're expecting to receive some info from Colorado about fake accounts. Will send along once I get it.

Matt is on a call right now, so he may have more to add or a different perspective, but no issues on my end not doing a call.

Regards,  
Brian

**From:** [REDACTED]@twitter.com>  
**Sent:** Tuesday, June 2, 2020 1:37 PM  
**To:** Scully, Brian [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>; Masterson, Matthew [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>  
**Cc:** [REDACTED]@twitter.com>  
**Subject:** Re: Primary Election Day

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Hi Matthew and Brian, we just wanted to check in.

We are tracking the curfew issues and have our legal team reviewing specific city-curfews in the key primary states. Our enforcement teams are prepared on the issue.

We have received some escalations from external stakeholders, including the FBI.

Things seem generally quiet -- so if it works ok for you -- let's plan to not meet today. Please just let us know if anything comes up.

Stacia

On Mon, Jun 1, 2020 at 4:25 PM [REDACTED]@twitter.com> wrote:

Dear Matthew and Brian, hope you are well.

We are preparing for elections tomorrow. In case anything comes up urgently, please feel free to call me at [REDACTED] or reach us via email.

Should we plan to set up a mid-day check in? Does 2:30 work for you?

Thanks,  
[REDACTED]

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**From:** Scully, Brian [/O=EXCHANGELABS/OU=EXCHANGE ADMINISTRATIVE GROUP (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/CN=RECIPIENTS/CN=7CA10604AEE04B1DAB53DC9F884130BD-SCULLY, BRI]  
**Sent:** 9/25/2020 11:31:16 AM  
**To:** [REDACTED]@twitter.com]  
**CC:** [REDACTED]@twitter.com]; Dragseth, John [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov]  
**Subject:** RE: Election DisInfo Reporting

5pm today is fine. I'll send an invite.

**From:** [REDACTED]@twitter.com>  
**Sent:** Friday, September 25, 2020 11:30 AM  
**To:** Scully, Brian [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>  
**CC:** [REDACTED]@twitter.com>; Dragseth, John [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>  
**Subject:** Re: Election Disinfo Reporting

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That sounds great!. Is 5pm today or Monday ok?

On Fri, Sep 25, 2020 at 11:18 AM Scully, Brian [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov> wrote:

Good Morning Stacia and Lisa,

Do you all have 5 minutes for a quick call today? I'd like to give you a quick update on our reporting process this year. I'm free the rest of the day, so whenever works for you.

Thanks,

Brian

Brian Scully

Chief, Countering Foreign Influence Task Force

DHS/CISA/NRMC

[REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov

[REDACTED]



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**From:** [REDACTED]@twitter.com]  
**Sent:** 9/10/2020 12:59:50 PM  
**To:** Masterson, Matthew [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov]; Scully, Brian [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov]  
**CC:** [REDACTED]@twitter.com]  
**Subject:** Update on Twitter's Civic Integrity Policy

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Hi Matthew and Brian, hope you are both very well.

We want to give you an update. Today, we are updating our Civic Integrity Policy. Our existing Civic Integrity Policy targets the most directly harmful types of content, namely those related to:

- Information or false claims on how to participate in civic processes
- Content that could intimidate or suppress participation
- False affiliation

Starting next week, we will label or remove false or misleading information intended to undermine public confidence in an election or other civic process. This includes but is not limited to:

- False or misleading information that causes confusion about the laws and regulations of a civic process, or officials and institutions executing those civic processes
- Disputed claims that could undermine faith in the process itself, e.g. unverified information about election rigging, ballot tampering, vote tallying, or certification of election results
- Misleading claims about the results or outcome of a civic process which calls for or could lead to interference with the implementation of the results of the process, e.g. claiming victory before election results have been certified, inciting unlawful conduct to prevent a peaceful transfer of power or orderly succession

You can find additional information [here](#) and [here](#).

Thanks so much,

[REDACTED]

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Sent: 10/27/2020 4:25:44 PM  
To: [REDACTED]@twitter.com]; [REDACTED]@twitter.com]; [REDACTED]@twitter.com]  
CC: CFITF [REDACTED]@hq.dhs.gov]; [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov  
Subject: FW: Flagging Three Twitter Accounts Impersonating Colorado Government

Please see below report from Colorado. I've asked them if these accounts have already been reported, but these are screenshots from today.

Regards,  
Brian

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CISA affirms that it neither has nor seeks the ability to remove or edit what information is made available on social media platforms. CISA makes no recommendations about how the information it is sharing should be handled or used by social media companies. Additionally, CISA will not take any action, favorable or unfavorable, toward social media companies based on decisions about how or whether to use this information.

From: Aaron Hayman [REDACTED]@SOS.STATE.CO.US>  
Sent: Tuesday, October 27, 2020 4:17 PM  
To: [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov; Masterson, Matthew [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>; Scully, Brian [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>  
Cc: Trevor Timmons [REDACTED]@SOS.STATE.CO.US>; Craig Buesing [REDACTED]@SOS.STATE.CO.US>; Nathan Blumenthal [REDACTED]@SOS.STATE.CO.US>; Josh Craven [REDACTED]@SOS.STATE.CO.US>; Judd Choate [REDACTED]@SOS.STATE.CO.US>; Hilary Rudy [REDACTED]@SOS.STATE.CO.US>; Melissa Kessler [REDACTED]@SOS.STATE.CO.US>; Ian Rayder [REDACTED]@SOS.STATE.CO.US>; Betsy Hart [REDACTED]@SOS.STATE.CO.US>; [REDACTED] <Steve.Hurlbert@SOS.STATE.CO.US>; Marygrace Galston [REDACTED]@SOS.STATE.CO.US>; Grenis, Timothy [REDACTED]@HQ.DHS.GOV>; Eastman - CDPS, Jerry [REDACTED]@state.co.us>; Lisa Kaplan [REDACTED]@aletheagroup.com>; Kristin Centanni [REDACTED]@srg.com>; [REDACTED]@state.co.us>; Bomba, Kristina [REDACTED]@state.co.us>; Rhoads, Devon [REDACTED]@state.co.us>; Rich Schliep [REDACTED]@SOS.STATE.CO.US>  
Subject: Flagging Three Twitter Accounts Impersonating Colorado Government

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EI-ISAC and CISA Partners,

Three Twitter accounts (@c\_ogov, @OfficalColorado, @COstateGov) popped up in the last couple of weeks impersonating the Colorado state government. As you may be aware, numerous other similar accounts have also been created impersonating other state and city jurisdictions in recent weeks. The MS-ISAC flagged a couple of them last week (@c\_ogov//@officalColorado) but we don't know if the third one (@COstateGov) is on everyone's radar. Has anyone engaged Twitter about these? Welcome any additional information you have.

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
These are concerning to us here in Colorado because of the recent FBI/CISA warnings about impersonation accounts spreading false information about the election. For the Colorado accounts:

- All three joined Twitter this month – October 2020
- All three have a URL link prominently labeled "Colorado.gov" that takes users to the official Colorado.gov website after passing through several other systems that could be harvest data or be more nefarious.
- All follow/are followed by up to a couple dozen other state/local government impersonation accounts – many also created recently.
- Several look like they were temporarily suspended by Twitter but at least some appear to be back online.

Below are screenshots taken today of the three accounts:



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
**Colorado State Government**

@COStateGov

Smoke weed erry day. The official (unofficial) Twitter account of the State of Colorado.

@ Colorado, USA colorado.gov Joined October 2020

21 Following 27 Followers



**Not Actually Colorado**

@OfficialColorado

The (UN)official Colorado Twitter Account.  
This is a parody account.

@ Colorado colorado.gov Joined October 2020

12 Following 56 Followers

**Disclaimer:** Colorado Department of State is not the originator of the above information and is forwarding it, unedited, from its original source. The Department does not seek the ability to remove or edit what information is made available

on social media platforms. The Department makes no recommendations about how the information it is sharing should be handled or used by recipients of this email. The Department may also share this information with local, state, and federal government agencies.

**Aaron Hayman**  
Senior Elections Security Specialist  
(office)  
[ahayman@sos.state.co.us](mailto:ahayman@sos.state.co.us)



Colorado  
Secretary of State



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From: [REDACTED]@fb.com)  
Sent: 11/7/2020 5:00:52 AM  
To: Masterson, Matthew [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov]; Scully, Brian [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov]  
Subject: October CIB Report

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Gents,

I hope you are well--what a week! Thank you for your continued partnership.

I also wanted to share that on November 6th we published our October CIB report, including all networks we've taken down in the month of October which were engaged in foreign or government interference and coordinated inauthentic behavior on Facebook and Instagram. In October, we removed 14 networks of accounts, Pages and Groups. Eight of them — from Georgia, Myanmar, Ukraine, and Azerbaijan — targeted domestic audiences in their own countries, and six networks — from Iran, Egypt, US, and Mexico — focused on people outside of their country. This October report includes 7 networks we already announced on October 8 and October 27, and 6 new networks.

- **Total number of Face book accounts removed:** 1,196
- **Total number of Instagram accounts removed:** 994
- **Total number of Pages removed:** 7,947
- **Total number of Groups removed:** 110

We are making progress rooting out this abuse, but as we've said before, it's an ongoing effort. We're committed to continually improving to stay ahead. That means building better technology, hiring more people and working closely with law enforcement, security experts and other companies.

#### Networks removed in October 2020:

1. **NEW Iran:** We removed 12 Facebook accounts, two Pages and 307 Instagram accounts linked to individuals associated with EITRC, a Tehran-based IT company. This activity originated in Iran and targeted primarily Israel, and also Iraq. This network was early in its audience building when we removed it. We found this activity as part of our investigation into suspected coordinated inauthentic behavior in the region.
2. **NEW Iran, Afghanistan:** We removed 33 Facebook accounts, 11 Pages, six Groups and 47 Instagram accounts operated by individuals in Iran and Afghanistan. They targeted Farsi/Dari-speaking audiences primarily in Afghanistan. We found this network as part of our internal investigation into suspected coordinated inauthentic behavior in the region.
3. **NEW Egypt, Turkey and Morocco:** We removed 31 Facebook accounts, 25 Pages and two Instagram accounts operated by individuals in Egypt, Turkey and Morocco associated with the Muslim Brotherhood. They targeted Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Yemen, Somalia and Saudi Arabia. We found this network as part of our internal investigation into suspected coordinated inauthentic behavior in the region.
4. **NEW Georgia:** We removed 50 Facebook accounts, 49 Pages, four Groups, eight Events and 19 Instagram accounts linked to Alt-Info, a media entity in Georgia. This activity originated in the country of Georgia and targeted domestic audiences in Georgia. Alt-Info is now banned from Facebook. We found this network as part of our investigation into suspected coordinated inauthentic behavior in the region. Our assessment benefited from public reporting by the International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy (ISFED), a non-profit in Georgia.
5. **NEW Georgia:** We removed 54 Facebook accounts, 14 Pages, two Groups and 21 Instagram accounts linked to two political parties in Georgia — Alliance of Patriots and Georgian Choice. This activity originated in the country of Georgia and targeted domestic audiences in Georgia. We found this network after reviewing information about some of its activity publicly reported by the International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy (ISFED), a non-profit in Georgia.

6. **NEW Myanmar:** We removed 36 Facebook accounts, six Pages, two Groups and one Instagram account linked to Openmind, a PR agency in Myanmar. This activity originated in Myanmar and targeted domestic audiences in Myanmar. We found this network as part of our proactive investigation into suspected coordinated inauthentic behavior in the region ahead of the November election in Myanmar.
7. **NEW Ukraine:** We removed 46 Facebook accounts, 44 Pages, one Group and three Instagram accounts linked to MAS Agency, a PR firm in Ukraine, and individuals associated with Yulia Tymoshenko's campaign and Batkivshchyna, a political party in Ukraine. This activity originated in Ukraine and targeted domestic audiences in Ukraine. We found this network as part of our investigation into suspected coordinated inauthentic behavior in the region. Our review benefited from public reporting on some of this activity in Ukraine.
8. **Mexico, Venezuela:** We removed 2 Facebook Pages and 22 Instagram accounts operated by individuals from Mexico and Venezuela. They primarily targeted the US. We began this investigation based on information about this network's off-platform activity from the FBI. Our internal investigation revealed the full scope of this network on Facebook. **(Originally announced on October 27, 2020)**
9. **Iran:** We also removed 12 Facebook accounts, 6 Pages and 11 Instagram accounts linked to individuals associated with the Iranian government. This small network originated in Iran and focused primarily on the US and Israel. It had some limited links to the CIB network we removed in April 2020. We began this investigation based on information from the FBI about this network's off-platform activity. **(Originally announced on October 27, 2020)**
10. **Myanmar:** We removed 10 Facebook accounts, 8 Pages, 2 Groups and 2 Instagram accounts operated by individuals in Myanmar. They focused on domestic audiences. We found this network as part of our proactive investigation into suspected coordinated inauthentic behavior ahead of the upcoming election in the region. **(Originally announced on October 27, 2020)**
11. **US:** We removed 202 Facebook accounts, 54 Pages and 76 Instagram accounts linked to Rally Forge, a US marketing firm, working on behalf of Turning Point USA and Inclusive Conservation Group. They focused primarily on domestic US audiences and also on Kenya and Botswana. Rally Forge is now banned from Facebook. We began our investigation after public reporting about some elements of this activity by the Washington Post. We are continuing to review all linked networks, and will take action as appropriate if we determine they are engaged in deceptive behavior. **(Originally announced on October 8, 2020)**
12. **Myanmar:** We removed 38 Facebook accounts, 15 Pages and 6 Instagram accounts linked to members of the Myanmar military. This activity originated in Myanmar and targeted domestic audiences. We began our investigation after reviewing local public reporting about some elements of this activity as part of our proactive work ahead of the upcoming election in Myanmar. **(Originally announced on October 8, 2020)**
13. **Azerbaijan:** We removed 589 Facebook accounts, 7,665 Pages and 437 accounts on Instagram linked to the Youth Union of New Azerbaijani Party. This network originated in Azerbaijan and focused primarily on domestic audiences. We identified this network through an internal investigation into suspected fake engagement activity in the region. **(Originally announced on October 8, 2020)**
14. **Nigeria:** We removed 78 Facebook accounts, 45 Pages, 93 Groups and 46 Instagram accounts linked to the Islamic Movement in Nigeria. This network originated primarily in Nigeria and focused on domestic audiences. We identified this activity through our investigation into suspected coordinated inauthentic behavior in the region with some limited links to the network we removed in March 2019. **(Originally announced on October 8, 2020)**

Here's a link to our full October CIB Report: <https://about.fb.com/news/2020/11/october-2020-cib-report/>

We shared information about these networks with researchers from Graphika, DFRLab, and Stanford's Internet Observatory and their reports on some of the new networks can be expected in the coming days.

Research announcements from announcements in the month of October can be found below:

- Stanford Internet Observatory's report on the US network (October 8): <https://cyber.fsi.stanford.edu/..oct-2020-fb-rallye-forge>
- Graphika's report on the Myanmar network (October 8): <https://graphika.com/reports/myanmar-military-network/>
- DFRLab's report on the Russian domestic CIB network (October 8): <https://medium.com/dfrlab/facebook-removed-inauthentic-network-connected-to-united-russia-party-6b9cfd2332de>

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- Graphika's report on the Mexico/Venezuela network (October 27): <https://graphika.com/reports/the-case-of-the-inauthentic-reposting-activists/>

Let me know if you have any questions.

Best,



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**From:** Scully, Brian [/O=EXCHANGELABS/OU=EXCHANGE ADMINISTRATIVE GROUP (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/CN=RECIPIENTS/CN=7CA10604AEE04B1DAB53DC9F884130BD-SCULLY, BRI]  
**Sent:** 10/23/2020 10:01:16 AM  
**To:** [REDACTED]@twitter.com  
**Subject:** RE: ISAC

Great. I'm trying to work on finding out if it's been sent separately, so at least I can give you a heads up. Hopefully we can get better at that as I'm trying not to drown you all.

Brian

**From:** [REDACTED]@twitter.com>  
**Sent:** Friday, October 23, 2020 9:59 AM  
**To:** Scully, Brian [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>  
**Subject:** Re: ISAC

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OK, we got that one already :)

Keep sending them our way. Impossible to know what we have and have not received.

On Fri, Oct 23, 2020 at 9:58 AM Scully, Brian [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov> wrote:

Yep.

**From:** [REDACTED]@twitter.com>  
**Sent:** Friday, October 23, 2020 9:58 AM  
**To:** Scully, Brian [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>  
**Subject:** Re: ISAC

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Wait, is it onen from Maryland Board of Elections?

On Fri, Oct 23, 2020 at 9:56 AM Scully, Brian [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov> wrote:

Yes, CFITF is my team sending when I'm not doing it. Thanks, I'll add Misinformation Reports to our emails (will be sending one in a second).

Thanks [REDACTED]

Brian

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From: [REDACTED]@twitter.com>  
Sent: Friday, October 23, 2020 9:55 AM  
To: Scully, Brian <[REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>  
Subject: Re: ISAC

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No problem at all. I am getting a bunch of email from someone with CTIFC or something anyway? Is that you?

On Fri, Oct 23, 2020 at 9:53 AM Scully, Brian <[REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov> wrote:

Hey Stacia,

Quick question for you – would you mind if I cc'd the ISAC on the reporting emails we send to Twitter? Right now, after I send an email to you, I send an email to the ISAC letting them know we reported. This would make things a bit more efficient on our end, but wanted to make sure you were comfortable with it before adding them.

Thanks,

Brian

Brian Scully

Chief, Countering Foreign Influence Task Force

DHS/CISA/NRMC

[REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov

Sent: 11/6/2020 12:20:13 PM  
To: [REDACTED]@fb.com]; [REDACTED]@fb.com]; [REDACTED]@fb.com]  
CC: CFITF [REDACTED]@hq.dhs.gov]  
Subject: RE: IG Disinfo Report

Hey Saleela,

In case it's helpful, just saw this debunking video on Twitter --  
<https://twitter.com/lanelytv/status/1324756117415776257?s=20>.

Brian

From: [REDACTED]@fb.com>  
Sent: Thursday, November 5, 2020 12:35 PM  
To: Scully, Brian [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>; [REDACTED]@fb.com>; [REDACTED]@fb.com>  
Cc: CFITF [REDACTED]@hq.dhs.gov>  
Subject: RE: IG Disinfo Report

CAUTION: This email originated from outside of DHS. DO NOT click links or open attachments unless you recognize and/or trust the sender. Contact your component SOC with questions or concerns.

Thank you, we will flag this for the teams!

From: Scully, Brian [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>  
Sent: Thursday, November 5, 2020 12:19 PM  
To: [REDACTED]@fb.com>; [REDACTED]@fb.com>; [REDACTED]@fb.com>  
Cc: CFITF [REDACTED]@hq.dhs.gov>  
Subject: IG Disinfo Report

Good afternoon Facebook,

Wanted to share this disinfo report about CISA and Director Krebs -- <https://www.instagram.com/p/CHNtFDPAUJH/>.

Regards,  
Brian

*The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is not the originator of this information. CISA is forwarding this information, unedited, from its originating source - this information has not been originated or generated by CISA. This information may also be shared with law enforcement or intelligence agencies.*

*CISA affirms that it neither has nor seeks the ability to remove or edit what information is made available on social media platforms. CISA makes no recommendations about how the information it is sharing should be handled or used by social media companies. Additionally, CISA will not take any action, favorable or unfavorable, toward social media companies based on decisions about how or whether to use this information.*

*In the event that CISA follows up to request further information, such a request is not a requirement or demand. Responding to this request is voluntary and CISA will not take any action, favorable or unfavorable, based on decisions about whether or not to respond to this follow-up request for information.*

CONFIDENTIAL

From: Scully, Brian [/O=EXCHANGELABS/OU=EXCHANGE ADMINISTRATIVE GROUP (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/CN=RECIPIENTS/CN=7CA10604AEE04B1DAB53DC9F884130BD-SCULLY, BRI]  
Sent: 11/10/2020 5:23:56 PM  
To: [REDACTED]@fb.com]  
CC: [REDACTED]@fb.com]  
Subject: RE: Hammer and scorecard narrative

I did.

From: [REDACTED]@fb.com>  
Sent: Tuesday, November 10, 2020 5:18 PM  
To: Scully, Brian [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>  
Cc: [REDACTED]@fb.com>  
Subject: Re: Hammer and scorecard narrative

CAUTION: This email originated from outside of DHS. DO NOT click links or open attachments unless you recognize and/or trust the sender. Contact your component SOC with questions or concerns.

Brian,

Also, just to confirm—will you let our USG partners know the meeting tomorrow is canx?

Thanks!

Sent from my iPhone

On Nov 10, 2020, at 4:10 PM, [REDACTED]@fb.com> wrote:

Many thanks for the quick reply.

Will let our partners know.

Enjoy your day!

Sent from my iPhone

On Nov 10, 2020, at 4:05 PM, Scully, Brian [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov> wrote:

Yes, let's cancel please.

Brian Scully  
DHS Countering Foreign Interference Task Force  
National Risk Management Center  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov

From: [REDACTED]@fb.com>  
Sent: Tuesday, November 10, 2020 4:01:23 PM  
To: Scully, Brian [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>

CONFIDENTIAL

Cc: [REDACTED]@fb.com>  
Subject: Re: Hammer and scorecard narrative

CAUTION: This email originated from outside of DHS. DO NOT click links or open attachments unless you recognize and/or trust the sender. Contact your component SOC with questions or concerns.

Brian—

One additional question. Given tomorrow is Veterans Day, will USG be available for our weekly call? Happy to canx so our federal partners can enjoy the holiday. Also wanted to ask so we could update our industry partners.

Thanks,  
[REDACTED]

Sent from my iPhone

On Nov 10, 2020, at 2:12 PM, Scully, Brian [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov> wrote:

This is very helpful Saleela. Thanks so much for sharing.

Brian

From: [REDACTED]@fb.com>  
Sent: Tuesday, November 10, 2020 2:11 PM  
To: Scully, Brian [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>  
Cc: [REDACTED]@fb.com>; [REDACTED]@fb.com>  
Subject: RE: Hammer and scorecard narrative

CAUTION: This email originated from outside of DHS. DO NOT click links or open attachments unless you recognize and/or trust the sender. Contact your component SOC with questions or concerns.

Hi Brian,

Wanted to follow up on the below to say that our teams have confirmed that we have third-party fact-checker verification that the "Hammer and Scorecard" narrative is false and our systems are labeling and downranking the content as identified. FWIW, in comparison to other election-related misinformation hoaxes that we have been actively tracking, the level of virality is less. Our teams take this particular narrative, among others, very seriously, and are continuing to actively monitor and iterate on appropriately enforcing against this content.

Again, thank you for the collaboration and engagement here, we are grateful and appreciative.

Saleela

From: [REDACTED]@fb.com>  
Sent: Tuesday, November 10, 2020 10:12 AM  
To: Scully, Brian [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>; [REDACTED]@fb.com>; [REDACTED]  
Subject: Re: Hammer and scorecard narrative

CONFIDENTIAL

Thank you, Brian. Our teams are actively monitoring developments on this at this time and to the extent you or USG have information about confirmed misinformation or other information of note, we absolutely welcome that for additional consideration and insight. Appreciate the ongoing collaboration very much.

---

**From:** Scully, Brian [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>

**Sent:** Tuesday, November 10, 2020 9:24:57 AM

**To:** [REDACTED]@fb.com>; [REDACTED]@fb.com>; [REDACTED]@fb.com>

**Subject:** Hammer and scorecard narrative

Good morning,

Director Krebs is particularly concerned about the hammer and scorecard narrative that is making the rounds. Wanted to see if you all have been tracking this narrative and if there's anything you can share around amplification?

Thanks,  
Brian

**From:** Scully, Brian [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov]  
**Sent:** 11/10/2020 6:44:54 PM  
**To:** [REDACTED]@twitter.com]  
**Subject:** Re: Hammer and scorecard narrative

Will do [REDACTED] Thank you!

Brian Scully  
DHS Countering Foreign Interference Task Force  
National Risk Management Center  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov

**From:** [REDACTED]@twitter.com>  
**Sent:** Tuesday, November 10, 2020 6:43:22 PM  
**To:** Scully, Brian [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>  
**Subject:** Re: Hammer and scorecard narrative

CAUTION: This email originated from outside of DHS. DO NOT click links or open attachments unless you recognize and/or trust the sender. Contact your component SOC with questions or concerns.

Hi Brian, hope you are well. Just a quick heads up, Politico published this piece about Director Krebs a few minutes ago. We noticed that one of his Tweets had been incorrectly labeled by our automated systems. We removed the label as soon as we noticed the issue. Please apologize to the Director on Twitter's behalf.

Thank you,  
[REDACTED]

On Tue, Nov 10, 2020 at 12:25 PM Scully, Brian <[REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov> wrote:

Yoel,

Thanks so much for the detailed response...very helpful. Will certainly pass anything we come across your way.

Brian

**From:** [REDACTED]@twitter.com>  
**Sent:** Tuesday, November 10, 2020 12:20 PM  
**To:** Scully, Brian [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>  
**Cc:** [REDACTED]@twitter.com>; [REDACTED]@twitter.com>  
**Subject:** Re: Hammer and scorecard narrative

CAUTION: This email originated from outside of DHS. DO NOT click links or open attachments unless you recognize and/or trust the sender. Contact your component SOC with questions or concerns.

Hey Brian,

CONFIDENTIAL

Sorry about the slow response - another crazy morning.

We've been tracking the Hammer/Scorecard issue closely, particularly since Director Krebs's tweet on the subject (which was pretty unambiguous as debunks go). We broadly labeled the conspiracy theory several days ago, pursuant to our policies. Once we enabled labeling, though, a 4chan-driven troll campaign kicked off, trying to reverse engineer our labeling logic and get labels to show up on unrelated tweets... which led to us turning off the automated labeling. We're going to backfill labels in bulk today for the period the automated labeling was disabled, but unfortunately we're in a bit of a cat-and-mouse situation where our ability to mitigate the conspiracy is tangled up in a clear attempt to work the ref by gaming our enforcements.

Let us know if there are especially high-profile examples of tweets sharing the conspiracy that *haven't* been labeled - we've been manually monitoring high-profile examples even once we disabled the automation, but it could be some slipped through the cracks.

Thanks,

[REDACTED]

On Tue, Nov 10, 2020 at 6:36 AM Scully, Brian [REDACTED] <[REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov> wrote:

Thanks [REDACTED]

From: [REDACTED] <[REDACTED]@twitter.com>  
Sent: Tuesday, November 10, 2020 9:35 AM  
To: Scully, Brian [REDACTED] <[REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>  
Cc: [REDACTED] <[REDACTED]@twitter.com>  
Subject: Re: Hammer and scorecard narrative

CAUTION: This email originated from outside of DHS. DO NOT click links or open attachments unless you recognize and/or trust the sender. Contact your component SOC with questions or concerns.

We have been tracking this issue. I will allow [REDACTED] to follow up with detailed information.

Thanks,

[REDACTED]

On Tue, Nov 10, 2020 at 9:22 AM Scully, Brian [REDACTED] <[REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov> wrote:

Good morning,

Director Krebs is very concerned about the hammer and scorecard narrative that's been making the rounds. Wondering if you all have been tracking that one and if there's anything you could share in terms of sharing and amplification?



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Thanks,  
Brian

**From:** [REDACTED]@twitter.com]  
**Sent:** 11/13/2020 11:36:32 PM  
**To:** Scully, Brian [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov]  
**Subject:** Re: FW: Twitter Assistance

CAUTION: This email originated from outside of DHS. DO NOT click links or open attachments unless you recognize and/or trust the sender. Contact your component SOC with questions or concerns.

We have labeled so many Tweets tonight, so I am afraid that for now the answer is that it isn't ending tonight. Talk soon!

On Fri, Nov 13, 2020 at 11:35 PM Scully, Brian <[REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov> wrote:

Ugh...do you all ever stop testifying?!? Good luck. You hang in there as well...the election has to end at some point, right? Right?

**From:** [REDACTED]@twitter.com>  
**Sent:** Friday, November 13, 2020 11:33 PM  
**To:** Scully, Brian <[REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>  
**Subject:** Re: FW: Twitter Assistance

CAUTION: This email originated from outside of DHS. DO NOT click links or open attachments unless you recognize and/or trust the sender. Contact your component SOC with questions or concerns.

Man, my boss testifies on Tuesday in front of Judiciary and I am so tired of working. Let's just hope tomorrow stays calm. Hang in there!

On Fri, Nov 13, 2020 at 11:26 PM Scully, Brian <[REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov> wrote:

Some Friday night fun for the two of us! ☺ Hope you are well.

Brian

**From:** [REDACTED]@twitter.com>  
**Sent:** Friday, November 13, 2020 11:21 PM  
**To:** Scully, Brian [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>  
**Cc:** [REDACTED]@twitter.com>; CFITF <[REDACTED]@hq.dhs.gov>  
**Subject:** Re: FW: Twitter Assistance

CAUTION: This email originated from outside of DHS. DO NOT click links or open attachments unless you recognize and/or trust the sender. Contact your component SOC with questions or concerns.

Thanks Brian, we will escalate.

On Fri, Nov 13, 2020 at 11:20 PM Scully, Brian <[REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov> wrote:

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██████ and ██████

Please see below report from Dominion regarding disinformation about the location of servers. For awareness, I redacted a second tweet based on legal guidance.

Regards,  
Brian

*The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is not the originator of this information. CISA is forwarding this information from its originating source -- this information has not been originated or generated by CISA. This information may also be shared with law enforcement or intelligence agencies.*

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*In the event that CISA follows up to request further information, such a request is not a requirement or demand. Responding to this request is voluntary and CISA will not take any action, favorable or unfavorable, based on decisions about whether or not to respond to this follow-up request for information.*

**From:** Kay Stimson ██████@dominionvoting.com>  
**Sent:** Friday, November 13, 2020 10:57:02 PM  
**To:** Masterson, Matthew ██████@cisa.dhs.gov>  
**Subject:** Twitter Assistance

CAUTION: This email originated from outside of DHS. DO NOT click links or open attachments unless you recognize and/or trust the sender. Contact your component SOC with questions or concerns.

Matt,

Can you assist with flagging this election disinformation content? It's patently false. Dominion has no server in Germany, and you should be able to confirm with DOD that this is untrue. Looks like it's recycling old viral claims and/or newer false claims posted to a disinformation website called thedonald.win, which we have also reported. Since the thread claims this is an Amazon server and it looks like others are saying this, you should be able to check with them to confirm this is fake news as well. Thanks.

Tweet to Report:

[Redacted]


CONFIDENTIAL

Tweet with Link to Recycled/Viral Rumor:

<https://twitter.com/cody41263233/status/1327421997782093830/photo/1>

Thanks,  
Kay

KAY STIMSON | VP, GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS  
DOMINION VOTING SYSTEMS

 | [DOMINIONVOTING.COM](https://www.dominionvoting.com)

From: [REDACTED]@twitter.com]  
Sent: 11/14/2020 11:25:52 AM  
To: Scully, Brian [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov]  
CC: CFITF [REDACTED]@hq.dhs.gov]; [REDACTED]@twitter.com]  
Subject: Re: FW: Twitter Assistance

CAUTION: This email originated from outside of DHS. DO NOT click links or open attachments unless you recognize and/or trust the sender. Contact your component SOC with questions or concerns.

Thank you, Brian. This Tweet has been labeled.

On Fri, Nov 13, 2020 at 11:20 PM [REDACTED]@twitter.com> wrote:  
Thanks Brian, we will escalate.

On Fri, Nov 13, 2020 at 11:20 PM Scully, [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov> wrote:  
[REDACTED] and [REDACTED]

Please see below report from Dominion regarding disinformation about the location of servers. For awareness, I redacted a second tweet based on legal guidance.

Regards,  
Brian

*The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) is not the originator of this information. CISA is forwarding this information from its originating source – this information has not been originated or generated by CISA. This information may also be shared with law enforcement or intelligence agencies.*

*CISA affirms that it neither has nor seeks the ability to remove or edit what information is made available on social media platforms. CISA makes no recommendations about how the information it is sharing should be handled or used by social media companies. Additionally, CISA will not take any action, favorable or unfavorable, toward social media companies based on decisions about how or whether to use this information.*

*In the event that CISA follows up to request further information, such a request is not a requirement or demand. Responding to this request is voluntary and CISA will not take any action, favorable or unfavorable, based on decisions about whether or not to respond to this follow-up request for information.*

From: Kay Stimson <[REDACTED]@dominionvoting.com>  
Sent: Friday, November 13, 2020 10:57:02 PM  
To: Masterson, Matthew <[REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>  
Subject: Twitter Assistance

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CAUTION: This email originated from outside of DHS. DO NOT click links or open attachments unless you recognize and/or trust the sender. Contact your component SOC with questions or concerns.

Matt,

Can you assist with flagging this election disinformation content? It's patently false. Dominion has no server in Germany, and you should be able to confirm with DOD that this is untrue. Looks like it's recycling old viral claims and/or newer false claims posted to a disinformation website called thedonald.win, which we have also reported. Since the thread claims this is an Amazon server and it looks like others are saying this, you should be able to check with them to confirm this is fake news as well. Thanks.

Tweet to Report:

[Redacted]

Tweet with Link to Recycled/Viral Rumor:

<https://twitter.com/cody41263233/status/1327421997782093830/photo/1>

Thanks,  
Kay

KAY STIMSON | VP, GOVERNMENT AFFAIRS  
DOMINION VOTING SYSTEMS  
[REDACTED] | [DOMINIONVOTING.COM](https://www.dominionvoting.com)

CONFIDENTIAL

From: Scully, Brian [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov  
Sent: 11/3/2020 3:42:16 PM  
To: [REDACTED]@fb.com]; Masterson, Matthew [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov  
CC: [REDACTED]@fb.com  
Subject: Re: Election Misinformation Confirmation Requested

Let me check. I'm being told PA is going to put out a statement on it shortly.

Brian Scully  
DHS Countering Foreign Interference Task Force  
National Risk Management Center  
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov

---

From: [REDACTED]@fb.com>  
Sent: Tuesday, November 3, 2020 3:39:57 PM  
To: Scully, Brian [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>; Masterson, Matthew [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>  
Cc: [REDACTED]@fb.com>  
Subject: Re: Election Misinformation Confirmation Requested

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Both, actually, if you might know?

---

From: Scully, Brian [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>  
Sent: Tuesday, November 3, 2020 3:37:01 PM  
To: [REDACTED]@fb.com>; Masterson, Matthew [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>  
Cc: [REDACTED]@fb.com>  
Subject: Re: Election Misinformation Confirmation Requested

Hi [REDACTED]

The poll worker destroying ballots is disinfo. It are you asking about whether or not the person was a poll worker?

Brian

Brian Scully  
DHS Countering Foreign Interference Task Force  
National Risk Management Center  
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov

---

From: [REDACTED]@fb.com>  
Sent: Tuesday, November 3, 2020 3:31:26 PM  
To: Scully, Brian [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>; Masterson, Matthew [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>  
Cc: [REDACTED]@fb.com>  
Subject: Election Misinformation Confirmation Requested

CAUTION: This email originated from outside of DHS. DO NOT click links or open attachments unless you recognize and/or trust the sender. Contact your component SOC with questions or concerns.

Hi Brian and Matt,

Can you please confirm the below is election misinformation?

<https://mobile.twitter.com/peterjhasson/status/1323716141202739201?s=21>

Thank You,

[REDACTED]



**From:** Scully, Brian [/O=EXCHANGELABS/OU=EXCHANGE ADMINISTRATIVE GROUP (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/CN=RECIPIENTS/CN=7CA10604AEE04B1DAB53DC9F884130BD-SCULLY, BRI]  
**Sent:** 11/6/2020 12:22:04 PM  
**To:** [REDACTED]@twitter.com]; [REDACTED]@twitter.com]; [REDACTED]@twitter.com]; Twitter Government & Politics [gov@twitter.com]  
**CC:** CFITF [REDACTED]@hq.dhs.gov]  
**Subject:** FW: Delaware County's response to video circulating of ballots

Twitter,

FYI – Delaware County, PA is debunking the below video.

Regards,  
Brian

**From:** Masterson, Matthew <[REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>  
**Sent:** Friday, November 6, 2020 12:20 PM  
**To:** Scully, Brian <[REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>; Dragseth, John <[REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>  
**Subject:** FW: Delaware County's response to video circulating of ballots

Brian and John,

Please see below from Delaware County PA debunking those videos I provided earlier. Can you provide to platforms as additional context?

Matthew V. Masterson  
Senior Cybersecurity Advisor  
Department of Homeland Security  
Cybersecurity & Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)

[REDACTED]@hq.dhs.gov

**From:** Myers, Jessica <[REDACTED]@pa.gov>  
**Sent:** Friday, November 6, 2020 12:00 PM  
**To:** Masterson, Matthew <[REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>  
**Subject:** Fwd: Delaware County's response to video circulating of ballots

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FYI  
Jessica C. Myers  
Director of Policy  
PA Department of State  
[REDACTED]

**From:** Yabut, Danilo [REDACTED]@pa.gov>  
**Sent:** Friday, November 6, 2020 11:59:33 AM  
**To:** Myers, Jessica [REDACTED]@pa.gov>  
**Subject:** FW: Delaware County's response to video circulating of ballots

**From:** Yabut, Danilo  
**Sent:** Friday, November 6, 2020 11:50 AM  
**To:** Degraffenreid, Veronica [REDACTED]@pa.gov>; Boockvar, Kathryn [REDACTED]@pa.gov>; Stevens, Sari [REDACTED]@pa.gov>; Marks, Jonathan [REDACTED]@pa.gov>; Murren, Wanda [REDACTED]@pa.gov>; Gates, Timothy [REDACTED]@pa.gov>; Kotula, Kathleen [REDACTED]@pa.gov>  
**Cc:** Lyon, Ellen [REDACTED]@pa.gov>; Humphrey, Laura [REDACTED]@pa.gov>; Parker, Scott [REDACTED]@pa.gov>; Paz, Darwin [REDACTED]@pa.gov>  
**Subject:** RE: Delaware County's response to video circulating of ballots

FYI: regarding this, they posted this on facebook:  
<https://www.facebook.com/DelawareCountyCouncil/posts/1883402795141692>

Dan

**From:** Degraffenreid, Veronica [REDACTED]@pa.gov>  
**Sent:** Friday, November 6, 2020 11:45 AM  
**To:** Boockvar, Kathryn [REDACTED]@pa.gov>; Stevens, Sari [REDACTED]@pa.gov>; Marks, Jonathan [REDACTED]@pa.gov>; Murren, Wanda [REDACTED]@pa.gov>; Yabut, Danilo [REDACTED]@pa.gov>; Gates, Timothy [REDACTED]@pa.gov>; Kotula, Kathleen [REDACTED]@pa.gov>  
**Subject:** FW: Delaware County's response to video circulating of ballots

**Veronica W. Degraffenreid | Special Advisor for Elections Modernization**  
Pennsylvania Department of State

Office: [REDACTED] | Mobile: [REDACTED] | Email: [REDACTED]

**From:** Reuther, Christine [REDACTED]@co.delaware.pa.us>  
**Sent:** Friday, November 6, 2020 11:44 AM  
**To:** Degraffenreid, Veronica [REDACTED]@pa.gov>  
**Subject:** Fwd: Delaware County's response to video circulating of ballots

Fyi.

[Get Outlook for Android](#)

**From:** Marofsky, Adrienne [REDACTED]@co.delaware.pa.us>  
**Sent:** Friday, November 6, 2020, 11:37 AM  
**To:** Zidek, Brian; Taylor, Monica; Madden, Kevin; Schaefer, Elaine; Reuther, Christine; Lazarus, Howard; Martin, William; [REDACTED]@duanemorris.com; Stollsteimer, Jack; Rouse, Tanner; Jackson, Marianne A.; Hagari, Lauren T.  
**Cc:** Herlinger, Ryan; Morrone, Katherine; Cairy, Deborah  
**Subject:** Delaware County's response to video circulating of ballots

As you may know, video has been circulating of an election worker along with allegations of fraud. Below is the statement that we issued along with a screen shot from the actual live stream. Once we have the number of ballots damaged, I will edit the release. I needed to get this out asap to respond to dozens of press calls.

Manipulated video has been circulating online purporting to show Delaware County election staff fraudulently filling in blank ballots. The video was taken from the official live stream provided by Delaware County; however, the circulated video is zoomed in to crop out the surrounding area, including the bipartisan observers who were not more than six feet away and does not give the full picture of the process.

The cropped video portrays an election worker, seemingly alone at a table, marking a ballot. The actual video shows the election worker at a table with other coworkers in a room full of people with bipartisan observers a few feet away at each end of the table, closely observing the worker from approximately 6 feet away. This arrangement was agreed upon between the Election Bureau and the former Republican Chairman of Delaware County Council, acting in his capacity as counsel for the Delaware County Republican Party.

During the processing of ballots, a machine extractor opens the ballots. Some ballots were damaged by the extractor during this process in such a way that the ballots could not be scanned successfully. According to the scanner manufacturer, Hart, the best practice to deal with damaged ballots that cannot be scanned is to transcribe the votes on each ballot to a clean ballot and scan the clean ballot. In accordance with that guidance, the Chief Clerk of the Delaware County Bureau of Elections instructed elections staff to manually transcribe the damaged ballots. As ballots were being transcribed, the original damaged ballots were directly beside the new ballots and bipartisan observers witnessed the process at close range. Damaged ballots have been preserved.

The Delaware County Bureau of Elections has been offering a live-streaming of the counting of ballots, which began on Nov. 3. The video allows residents to watch the process in real-time and offers a transparent view of the process. Unfortunately, some residents have altered to video and are making false accusations, which baselessly and wrongly attacks the integrity of the election staff and the completely transparent process by which votes are being counted in Delaware County.

(The attached screen shot of the video shows the election worker at a table with other coworkers in a room full of people with bipartisan observers closely observing the worker.)

Sincerely,  
Adrienne Marofsky  
Public Relations Director for Delaware County

CONFIDENTIAL

From: [REDACTED]@google.com]  
Sent: 12/9/2020 9:09:29 AM  
To: Scully, Brian [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov]; Snell, Allison [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov]; Schaul, Robert [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov]  
Subject: YouTube Policy Update

CAUTION: This email originated from outside of DHS. DO NOT click links or open attachments unless you recognize and/or trust the sender. Contact your component SOC with questions or concerns.

Good Morning,

I am writing to let you know about an update to YouTube's policies pertaining to election-related misinformation and to offer a briefing about these updates.

Beginning today, we will prohibit content alleging that widespread fraud or errors changed the outcome in any past US Presidential election. For example, we will remove videos claiming that a presidential candidate won the election as a result of widespread software glitches or counting errors. Given that states' certification of election results show that Biden has won, and our policies relating to misinformation about past elections now apply to content about the US 2020 presidential election uploaded beginning December 9. We will not issue any strikes to channels for removals between now and January 20. From January 20 forward, channels will be eligible to receive strikes for violative content they upload to YouTube. You can read more about our 2020 US election efforts in our blog post [here](#).

Best Regards,

Kevin

--

[REDACTED] Government Affairs & Public Policy Manager,

YouTube | [REDACTED]@google.com | [REDACTED]

CONFIDENTIAL

**From:** [REDACTED]@twitter.com]  
**Sent:** 1/7/2021 10:58:39 PM  
**To:** Misinformation Reports [REDACTED]@cisecurity.org]  
**CC:** Scully, Brian [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov]; [REDACTED]@twitter.com  
**Subject:** Re: FW: Election Related Misinformation

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Thank you, Aaron. Both Tweets have been removed from the service.

Thank you,  
Stacia

On Thu, Jan 7, 2021 at 3:53 PM [REDACTED]@twitter.com> wrote:  
Thank you, Aaron. We will escalate.

Thanks,  
Stacia

On Thu, Jan 7, 2021 at 3:44 PM Misinformation Reports <[REDACTED]@cisecurity.org> wrote:  
Brian, Twitter,

Please see this report below from the Arizona SOS office. Please let me know if you have any questions.

Cc: [REDACTED], I am not sure the best contact email to send this to at Twitter.

Thanks,

Aaron


**From:** C. Murphy Hebert <[REDACTED]@azsos.gov>  
**Sent:** Thursday, January 7, 2021 3:26 PM  
**To:** Misinformation Reports <[REDACTED]@cisecurity.org>  
**Cc:** Ken Matta <[REDACTED]@azsos.gov>; Allie Bones <[REDACTED]@azsos.gov>  
**Subject:** Election Related Misinformation

Hello,

I'm Murphy Hebert, communications director for the Office of the Arizona Secretary of State.  
Email: [REDACTED]@azsos.gov

I am flagging this twitter account for your review. @nomial\_every

[https://twitter.com/normal\\_every](https://twitter.com/normal_every)



Of specific concern to the Secretary of State are the following tweets:

[https://twitter.com/normal\\_every/status/1346451683384160257](https://twitter.com/normal_every/status/1346451683384160257)

[https://twitter.com/normal\\_every/status/1346233687160008704](https://twitter.com/normal_every/status/1346233687160008704)

Reason: These messages falsely assert that the Voter Registration System is owned and therefore operated by foreign actors.

This is an attempt to further undermine confidence in the election institution in Arizona.

Thank you for your consideration in reviewing this matter for action.

Sincerely,

C. Murphy Hebert  
Communications Director  
Arizona Secretary of State

.....

This message and attachments may contain confidential information. If it appears that this message was sent to you by mistake, any retention, dissemination, distribution or copying of this message and attachments is strictly prohibited. Please notify the sender immediately and permanently delete the message and any attachments.

.....

CONFIDENTIAL

From: [REDACTED]@fb.com]  
Sent: 5/4/2022 3:48:11 PM  
To: Protentis, Lauren [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov]  
CC: Hale, Geoffrey (He/Him) [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov]; Snell, Allison (She/Her) [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov];  
[REDACTED]@fb.com]; Schaul, Robert [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov]; Scully, Brian  
[REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov]; Kuennen, David [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov]; [REDACTED]@fb.com];  
[REDACTED]@fb.com]  
Subject: Re: Account Security

Hello Team CISA!

Hope you are all well.

In our conversation a few weeks ago, you mentioned that your team could potentially help connect us with local election offices. Is this something you are still able to help with? Additionally, we can provide a training for them on account security best practices if you think that could be helpful.

And as always, if there is anything we can do to be helpful in the meantime, please let us know!


Thanks,  
[REDACTED]

From: Protentis, Lauren [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>  
Date: Wednesday, April 27, 2022 at 12:37 PM  
To: [REDACTED]@fb.com>, [REDACTED]@fb.com>  
Cc: Hale, Geoffrey (He/Him) <[REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>, Snell, Allison (She/Her) [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>, [REDACTED]@fb.com>, [REDACTED]@fb.com>, [REDACTED]@fb.com>, Schaul, Robert [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>, Scully, Brian [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>, Kuennen, David [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>  
Subject: Re: Account Security

Perfect thank you so much!

Lauren Protentis • Mis, Dis, Malinformation Team • National Risk Management Center • Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)

M: [REDACTED] | E: [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov | HSDN: [REDACTED]@dhs.gov.gov |  
CLAN: [REDACTED]@dhs.ic.gov



From: [REDACTED]@fb.com>  
Sent: Wednesday, April 27, 2022 11:15:25 AM  
To: Protentis, Lauren [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>; [REDACTED]@fb.com>



CONFIDENTIAL

Cc: Hale, Geoffrey (He/Him) [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>; Snell, Allison (She/Her) [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>; [REDACTED]@fb.com>; [REDACTED]@fb.com>; [REDACTED]@fb.com>; [REDACTED]@fb.com>; Schaul, Robert [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>; Scully, Brian [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>; Kuennen, David [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>

Subject: Re: Account Security

Got it – and no problem! I had our team design my email directly into the document (new version attached here) so everything is all in one place for you.

Best,

∞ Meta

[REDACTED]  
State and Local Politics & Government Outreach  
[REDACTED]@fb.com

From: Protentis, Lauren [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>  
Date: Wednesday, April 20, 2022 at 12:45 PM  
To: [REDACTED]@fb.com>, [REDACTED]@fb.com>  
Cc: Hale, Geoffrey (He/Him) <[REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>, Snell, Allison (She/Her) <[REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>, [REDACTED]@fb.com>, [REDACTED]@fb.com>, [REDACTED]@fb.com>, Schaul, Robert <[REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>, Scully, Brian <[REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>, Kuennen, David <[REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>

Subject: RE: Account Security

Hi [REDACTED] That could work, though we'd also welcome that as part of the document. Given we have a broader team that does trainings etc, it might be helpful for that info to be included in the doc. Though I understand there may be concerns with this approach.

Will take your steer, let me know what you think.

Lauren Protentis (She/Her)  
Mis, Dis, and Mal-information (MDM) Team  
Election Security Initiative  
National Risk Management Center  
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency  
O: [REDACTED] | Email: [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov | HSDN: [REDACTED]@dhs.gov | CLAN: [REDACTED]@dhs.gov



From: [REDACTED]@fb.com>  
Sent: Monday, April 18, 2022 5:30 PM  
To: [REDACTED]@fb.com>; Protentis, Lauren [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>  
Cc: Hale, Geoffrey (He/Him) <[REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>; Snell, Allison (She/Her) [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>; [REDACTED]@fb.com>; [REDACTED]@fb.com>; [REDACTED]@fb.com>; [REDACTED]@fb.com>; Schaul, Robert [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>; Scully, Brian [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>



CONFIDENTIAL

<[REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>; Kuennen, David <[REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>

**Subject:** Re: Account Security

Thanks Lauren!

Would it work to just provide my email when you share out this one pager, and let them know if they need anything (like a page verification) or have any content they want to escalate for review, they can reach out to me and I can get them to the right person to help?

Best,

∞ Meta

Eva Guidarini  
State and Local Politics & Government Outreach  
[REDACTED]

**From:** [REDACTED]@fb.com>

**Date:** Monday, April 18, 2022 at 11:50 AM

**To:** Protentis, Lauren <[REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>

**Cc:** Hale, Geoffrey (He/Him) <[REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>, Snell, Allison (She/Her)

<[REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>, [REDACTED]@fb.com>, [REDACTED]

<[REDACTED]@fb.com>, [REDACTED]@fb.com>, [REDACTED]@fb.com>, [REDACTED]

<[REDACTED]@fb.com>, Schaul, Robert <[REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>, Scully, Brian <[REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>,

Kuennen, David <[REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>

**Subject:** Re: Account Security

Great! Many thank, Lauren for the quick reply & feedback.

[REDACTED] - who is cc'd on our team will loop in others from her team

Happy to move some of your colleagues to BCC as needed/defer. to you to do that as [REDACTED] and her team work out the details.

Sent from my iPhone

On Apr 18, 2022, at 10:54 AM, Protentis, Lauren <[REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov> wrote:

Thanks so much for sending, [REDACTED]!

This looks great - the only thing I'd recommend adding is any steps for flagging or escalating MDM content, if possible. I think then that would make this a comprehensive product on both of the critical needs for officials - account security and MDM concerns. We discussed this a bit in our in-person meeting two weeks ago. Let me know if that's doable.

Thank you!

Lauren Protentis (She/Her)  
Mis, Dis, and Mal-Information (MDM) Team  
Election Security Initiative

National Risk Management Center  
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency

O: [REDACTED] | Email: [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov | HSDN: [REDACTED]@dhs.gov | CLAN: [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]@dhs.ic.gov

From: [REDACTED]@fb.com>

Sent: Friday, April 15, 2022 9:01 AM

To: Protentis, Lauren [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>; Hale, Geoffrey (He/Him) [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>; Snell, Allison (She/Her) <Allison.Snell@cisa.dhs.gov>

Cc: [REDACTED]@fb.com>; [REDACTED]@fb.com>; [REDACTED]@fb.com>  
[REDACTED]@fb.com>; [REDACTED]@fb.com>; [REDACTED]@fb.com>

Subject: Account Security

CAUTION: This email originated from outside of DHS. DO NOT click links or open attachments unless you recognize and/or trust the sender. Contact your component SOC with questions or concerns.

Good Morning!

As discussed during our meeting last week, I wanted to share our account security doc that we've been working on.

We would be grateful for any feedback and would be happy to set up a call to discuss. I am including [REDACTED] & [REDACTED] who you met during our meeting & are helping implement these procedures with key stakeholders. Also, [REDACTED] to help schedule a call to discuss, if helpful.

Many thanks for your collaboration & best for a great weekend!

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**From:** Protentis, Lauren [/O=EXCHANGELABS/OU=EXCHANGE ADMINISTRATIVE GROUP (FYDIBOHF23SPDLT)/CN=RECIPIENTS/CN=604C2D8C37944283805D4BD9A9A83476-LAUREN.PROT]  
**Sent:** 5/20/2022 10:35:56 AM  
**To:** [REDACTED]@microsoft.com]; [REDACTED] (CELA) [REDACTED]@microsoft.com]; Jeremy [REDACTED]@microsoft.com]; [REDACTED] (CELA) [REDACTED]@microsoft.com]  
**Subject:** RE: One-Pager for Elections Officials

Many, many thanks! Really appreciate it ☺

Lauren Protentis (She/Her)  
Mis, Dis, and Mal-information (MDM) Team  
Election Security Initiative  
National Risk Management Center  
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency

O: [REDACTED] | Email: [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov | HSDN: [REDACTED]@dhs.sgov.gov | CLAN: [REDACTED]@dhs.ic.gov



**From:** [REDACTED]@microsoft.com>  
**Sent:** Friday, May 20, 2022 9:59 AM  
**To:** Protentis, Lauren [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>; [REDACTED] (CELA) [REDACTED]@microsoft.com>; [REDACTED]@microsoft.com>; [REDACTED] (CELA) [REDACTED]@microsoft.com>  
**Subject:** RE: One-Pager for Elections Officials

CAUTION: This email originated from outside of DHS. DO NOT click links or open attachments unless you recognize and/or trust the sender. Contact your component SOC with questions or concerns.

Lauren,

Thanks for reaching out. Attached is Microsoft's 1 pager for inclusion. Please let us know if you have any questions.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Director of Information Integrity  
Democracy Forward Team (CELA)  
[REDACTED]@microsoft.com

**From:** Protentis, Lauren [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>  
**Sent:** Thursday, May 19, 2022 11:14 AM  
**To:** [REDACTED] (CELA) [REDACTED]@microsoft.com>; [REDACTED]@microsoft.com>; [REDACTED]@microsoft.com>  
**Subject:** [EXTERNAL] One-Pager for Elections Officials

Hi [REDACTED]

I hope this email finds you well! Not sure this ask is as relevant to Microsoft, but thought I'd check. Meta is working with industry partners to create one-pagers for elections officials (in the lead up to the midterms) that provide steps to create secure accounts and to report MDM. We'll be sharing these products at our various engagements with officials.

Given your operating model is different than social media platforms, I'm not sure this is relevant. But, if so, we'd be happy to receive one from Microsoft.

I've attached a few examples of what the other companies have done.

Thanks so much!

Lauren Protentis (She/Her)  
Mis, Dis, and Mal-information (MDM) Team  
Election Security Initiative  
National Risk Management Center  
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency

O: [REDACTED] | Email: [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov | HSDN: [REDACTED]@dhs.sgov.gov | CLAN: [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]@dhs.ic.gov



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From: [REDACTED]@twitter.com]  
Sent: 5/12/2022 4:43:21 PM  
To: Protentis, Lauren [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov]  
Subject: Re: Twitter POC  
Attachments: Election Officials Best Practices.pdf

Sure thing, here's the updated version!

On Thu, May 12, 2022 at 4:32 PM Protentis, Lauren [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov> wrote:  
That would be so helpful if you could add it to the doc, thank you!

Lauren Protentis • Mis, Dis, Malinformation Team • National Risk Management Center • Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)

M: [REDACTED] | E: [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov | HSDN: [REDACTED]@dhs.gov |  
CLAN: [REDACTED]@dhs.ic.gov

 The linked image cannot be displayed. The file may have been moved or

From: [REDACTED]@twitter.com>  
Sent: Thursday, May 12, 2022 1:48:06 PM  
To: Protentis, Lauren [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>  
Subject: Re: Twitter POC

The best way for them to do that is to contact [REDACTED]@twitter.com. I can add that to the doc if that would be helpful

On Thu, May 12, 2022 at 2:16 PM Protentis, Lauren [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov> wrote:  
Actually one question: is there a way to include something about how to report disinformation?

Lauren Protentis • Mis, Dis, Malinformation Team • National Risk Management Center • Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)

M: [REDACTED] | E: [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov | HSDN: [REDACTED]@dhs.gov |  
CLAN: [REDACTED]@dhs.ic.gov

 The linked image cannot be displayed. The file may have been moved or

From: Protentis, Lauren [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>  
Sent: Thursday, May 12, 2022 1:11:25 PM  
To: [REDACTED]@twitter.com>  
Subject: Re: Twitter POC

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Thanks so much! Really appreciate it! State and local officials in NH and IL will be the first recipients of this, so thanks in advance.

Lauren Protentis • Mis, Dis, Malinformation Team • National Risk Management Center • Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)

M: [REDACTED] | E: [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov | HSDN: [REDACTED]@dhs.gov |

CLAN: [REDACTED]@dhs.gov

☒ The linked image cannot be displayed. The file may have been moved or

---

From: [REDACTED]@twitter.com>

Sent: Thursday, May 12, 2022 7:40:47 AM

To: Protentis, Lauren <[REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>

Subject: Re: Twitter POC

Hey Lauren,

Apologies for the delay, got final approval late last night. Here's a one-pager covering best practices, escalations, verification, and safety tools.

Thanks and let me know if you need anything else!

[REDACTED]

On Wed, May 11, 2022 at 10:39 AM [REDACTED]@twitter.com> wrote:

Hey Lauren,

I'll have the one pager for you later today, just getting the final sign off before sending over

Thanks!

[REDACTED]

On Wed, May 11, 2022 at 9:09 AM Protentis, Lauren <[REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov> wrote:

Hi [REDACTED] and [REDACTED], Hope this email finds you well! Wanted to circle-back on this and see if you have any questions! The team has a few upcoming engagements with elections officials where this one-pager would be particularly helpful to share as a leave-behind.

All my best,

Lauren Protentis (She/Her)

Mis, Dis, and Mal-information (MDM) Team

Election Security Initiative

National Risk Management Center

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Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency

O: [REDACTED] | Email: [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov | HSDN: [REDACTED]@dhs.sgov.gov |  
CLAN: [REDACTED]@dhs.ic.gov



**From:** Protentis, Lauren [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>  
**Sent:** Thursday, May 5, 2022 7:27 AM  
**To:** [REDACTED]@twitter.com>  
**Cc:** [REDACTED]@twitter.com>  
**Subject:** Re: Twitter POC


Great, thanks [REDACTED] and [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]: As referenced below, we're collecting one-pagers from our industry partners that illuminates best practices/instructions for account security, account verification, and reporting MDM, for elections officials. This will be a tool/resource we can share as we conduct trainings in advance of the midterms.

Let me know if you have any questions!

Laure

**Lauren Protentis • Mis, Dis, Malinformation Team • National Risk Management Center •  
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)**  
M: [REDACTED] | E: [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov | HSDN: [REDACTED]@dhs.sgov.gov |  
CLAN: [REDACTED]@dhs.ic.gov



---

**From:** [REDACTED]@twitter.com>  
**Sent:** Wednesday, May 4, 2022 4:53:00 PM  
**To:** Protentis, Lauren [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>  
**Cc:** [REDACTED]@twitter.com>  
**Subject:** Re: Twitter POC

Hi Lauren -

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Glad to meet you, [REDACTED] from our team knows DHS very well from his time on the Hill. He's a great person to assist you on this.

Best,

TO

On Tue, May 3, 2022 at 1:20 PM Protentis, Lauren <[REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov> wrote:

Awesome! I'm meeting with Region 1 to include New Hampshire who mentioned that it was helpful for us to provide the verification information from Twitter last week. So, thanks again.

**Lauren Protentis • Mis, Dis, Malinformation Team • National Risk Management Center • Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)**

M: [REDACTED] E: [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov | HSDN: [REDACTED]@dhs.gov |  
CLAN: [REDACTED]@dhs.ic.gov

---

**From:** [REDACTED]@twitter.com>

**Sent:** Tuesday, May 3, 2022 1:14:56 PM

**To:** Protentis, Lauren <[REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>; [REDACTED]@twitter.com>

**Cc:** [REDACTED]@twitter.com>; [REDACTED]@twitter.com>

**Subject:** Re: Twitter POC

Hey Lauren,

Thanks for checking in on this. Adding [REDACTED] on our Public Policy team, who should be able to share our resources on this.

[REDACTED]

On Tue, May 3, 2022 at 10:14 AM Protentis, Lauren <[REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov> wrote:

Hi [REDACTED], As mentioned in recent Industry Syncs, we're looking for one-pagers for elections officials that highlight platform best practices for getting verified (which you've provided below), account security and MDM reporting.

Is this something your team is able to pull together? I'm happy to share what others provided. I'd that would be helpful to get you started.

Let me know if you have any questions!

**Lauren Protentis • Mis, Dis, Malinformation Team • National Risk Management Center • Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA)**

M: [REDACTED] E: [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov | HSDN: [REDACTED]@dhs.gov |  
CLAN: [REDACTED]@dhs.ic.gov



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From: [REDACTED]@twitter.com>  
Sent: Wednesday, April 20, 2022 1:59:00 PM  
To: Protentis, Lauren <[REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>  
Cc: [REDACTED]@twitter.com>; [REDACTED]@twitter.com>  
Subject: Re: FW: Twitter POC

CAUTION: This email originated from outside of DHS. DO NOT click links or open attachments unless you recognize and/or trust the sender. Contact your component SOC with questions or concerns.

Hey Lauren,

Government officials can apply through the public channel, or reach out by email to [gov@twitter.com](mailto:gov@twitter.com).  
Thanks!

[REDACTED]  
On Wed, Apr 20, 2022 at 9:42 AM Protentis, Lauren <[REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov> wrote:  
Greetings [REDACTED] and [REDACTED].

I suspect we'll receive this question more often as the midterms continue. A state elections agency in New Hampshire is inquiring about getting verified on Twitter.

In order for elections officials and state and local officials to verify their Twitter accounts, should we simply direct them to this information: [Twitter verification requirements - how to get the blue check](#)

Or is there another process or person you'd prefer we direct them towards?

Thank you!

Lauren Protentis (She/Her)  
Mis, Dis, and Mal-information (MDM) Team  
Election Security Initiative  
National Risk Management Center  
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency

O: [REDACTED] | Email: [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov | HSDN: [REDACTED]@dhs.sgov.gov |  
CLAN: [REDACTED]@dhs.ic.gov

CONFIDENTIAL



**From:** Moser, Michael (He/Him) <[REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov> **On Behalf Of** ElectionTaskForce  
**Sent:** Wednesday, April 20, 2022 11:00 AM  
**To:** Modricker, Daniel <[REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>; Protentis, Lauren <[REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>  
**Cc:** Tipton, James <[REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>; ElectionTaskForce <[REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>  
**Subject:** RE: Twitter POC

Hi Dan,

I'm adding Lauren Protentis to this chain, who's from our MDM team, to see if she may have some thoughts on how to proceed.

Kind Regards,

Mike Moser

(He/Him)

IT Cybersecurity Specialist (INFOSEC)

Engagement, Assistance, and Training

Election Security Initiative

National Risk Management Center

Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency

M: [REDACTED] | [REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov



**From:** Modricker, Daniel <[REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>  
**Sent:** Tuesday, April 19, 2022 8:22 PM  
**To:** ElectionTaskForce <[REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>  
**Cc:** Tipton, James <[REDACTED]@cisa.dhs.gov>  
**Subject:** Twitter POC

Greetings,

CONFIDENTIAL

During a meeting with a state elections partner we identified that their agency does not have the "verified identity" blue check for their Twitter account.

Is there a POC at Twitter to contact, or an expedited process for state elections agencies to pursue verification?

Best,  
Dan

**Daniel Modriker**

Outreach Coordinator, Region 1

Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency

Cell: [REDACTED] | Email: [REDACTED]@hq.dhs.gov



**CISA**  
CYBER+INFRASTRUCTURE